

THE TRANSITION TO AN INDEPENDENT SOUTHERN SUDAN: HOW SHOULD
THE US MILITARY POSTURE TO INFLUENCE AND DETER FACTORS
THAT MAY CAUSE REGIONAL INSTABILITY?

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE TRANSITION TO AN INDEPENDENT SOUTHERN SUDAN: HOW SHOULD THE US MILITARY POSTURE TO INFLUENCE AND DETER FACTORS THAT MAY CAUSE REGIONAL INSTABILITY? By Major Grant A. Fish, 98 pages.

The factors ultimately leading to the secession and the anticipated independence of Southern Sudan, from the Government of Sudan, find their foundation in the nation's history, culture, and resource exploitation. As the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is concluded, and the fragile peace settles almost 40 years of civil war, these two nations must understand how to collaborate to continue peace and economic development. Numerous factors and international players are influencing the equilibrium between peace and war. One of these international actors is the United States, which has applied a whole of government approach to stabilizing Southern Sudan and the surrounding region. While the US is applying all national instruments of power, the application of the military instrument of power offers a number of options to stabilize the region. These options must be balanced against international perceptions, US political considerations, and financial obligations. This paper considers and evaluates those possible options against the factors influencing the instability and provides recommendations.

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ACRONYMS

AFRICOM	Africa Command
AU	African Union
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DIME	Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic
DOS	United States Department of State
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
GoSS	Government of Southern Sudan
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
NCP	National Congress Party
NSS	National Security Strategy
PRC	People's Republic of China
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
WOG	Whole of Government

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the conflict in Sudan, its significance, and the reasons for United States (US) involvement. The section will explain the US' national security interest in the state, provide an overview of the conflict, and a brief national history. By establishing this foundation, the author will frame the environment, major issues, and impasses, which are relevant to potential US operations in Sudan and the surrounding region. This section also served to identify and define the reasons for instability. Finally, this chapter will identify the primary and secondary research questions, limitations, delimitations, and assumptions associated with this study.

Why Sudan?

In 2005, the government of Sudan signed into effect a peace plan ending nearly 40 years of civil war. This document, commonly referred to as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), established a six-year cooling down period between the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) of Northern Sudan and the Southern region, administrated by the semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS). Upon completion of this six-year period, a vote took place with two distinct options: (1) To determine separation of the two regions, or (2) to unified the two regions with sole governance under the NCP. In January 2011, the decision to divide the nation was certain.

With such major events imminent, the *2010 US National Security Strategy (NSS)* addressed its renewed commitment to Sudan. Specifically mentioned in the *NSS* was the

willingness to support the implementation of the CPA and accomplishment of the referendum affecting the future of Southern Sudan (The White House 2010a). Other than sustainment, global peace, and development of effective global cooperation, the *NSS* fails to mention why the US has such a strong interest in Sudan. A review of current and future US global interests may provide the answer.

The world watched the last four decades as Sudan has torn itself apart. With millions slaughtered, maimed, and displaced, the international community has finally come together to ease tension in this battle torn region. The obvious reason for US involvement was to reduce instability in the region, end the civil war, and prevent future terrorist safe havens. While these are very noble reasons for action, history illustrates the US has failed to act for similar reasons on occasion in the past. Perhaps a more valuable strategic goal is establishing a better foothold in Africa and positioning to take advantage of the developing resources that are becoming more prevalent. The purpose of this paper is not to establish the reason for US involvement in Sudan, but to examine the capability of the US military to reduce regional instability if called to do so. However, it is important to understand that US policy in this region of the world is still evolving, and the United States Government (USG) has yet to present solid reasons for its decisions for its involvement.

It is this author's intent to evaluate the causes of instability in Sudan, discuss whom the major actors are, and how they are motivated. To determine these causes, issues and players, the author will conduct a historical review of the nation's history and a thorough review of the pertinent literature. Upon determining the issues and actors, the

paper will investigate why the US is acting in Sudan and how it is applying the whole of government (WOG) approach to reduce regional instability. An understanding of the national instruments of power will provide the criteria upon which to judge whether the US military is a viable instrument for national action, and in what capacity its application may best be applied.

Conflict Background

In recent years, Sudan has been referred to as a country on brink of a new future, a nation at the crossroads (Deng 2007). Sudan, the largest country in Africa and 10th largest in the world, is finally becoming two nations. As a result of nearly 40 years of conflict, this country has suffered from two civil wars, slavery, and genocide, and has endured a humanitarian crisis responsible for creating 2.7 million internally displaced persons (IDP) and over 250,000 refugees (Ives 2010).

It is not a secret that the US has been observing Sudan for years. This is a country recovering from incessant civil war killing nearly 2 million Sudanese people. Perhaps more importantly for the US, it also holds the indisputable claim to being the once headquarters to Osama Bin Laden and other notables on the who's who list of international terrorism (Brown 2003).

Disputes over ownership, control and distribution of natural resources have further contributed to instability in Sudan. Historically, Southern Sudan was regarded as a primitive, undeveloped region, which the "civilized" northern Islamic population disregarded. Other than influence from Christian mission organizations, this region maintained an almost preserved tribal state. As times have changed, and oil was

discovered, this previously unrecognized portion of the nation is now economically pivotal as it accounts for over 80 percent of Sudan's oil production (Mazen and Shahine 2010).

Foundations of the nation's conflict are a result of early colonial influences that impacted the development of culture and religion. Additionally, poor governance, corruption, and lack of precise demarcation of territorial lines have also complicated matters and increased regional instability. The combination of these ingredients led to nearly forty years of civil war. Militarily, both sides fought until exhausted, and upon observing that conventional military action could no longer achieve their goals, the NCP and GoSS approached the peace table. The nation's hostilities were deferred as a six-year power sharing peace deal was signed in 2005. Since then there has been a reduction in the overt tension for war and a very fragile peace agreement (Dagne 2010). On 9 January 2011, a vote was cast determining re-unification with Sudan or Southern independence. The decision was practically unanimous with 99 percent of Southern Sudanese voting for secession. While this event has transpired relatively peacefully, a number of issues still require detailed attention in order to maintain the fragile harmony. While the CPA outlines procedures for determining wealth and power sharing, management of governments, and security arrangements, it fails to account for boundary demarcation and leaves the resolution of other regional conflicts in Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and the Blue Nile incomplete.

This prospective nation, Southern Sudan, has now garnered international attention. It has inescapably drawn the attention of its neighboring countries of Eritrea,

Ethiopia, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Uganda, which still harbor its refugees from the recent conflict with the government of Khartoum. Oil and natural gas organizations, such as British Petroleum and China Natural Petroleum Corporation are fiercely competing with each other to get in to Sudan as it is in the development phase of oil production. Still, other nations from the West, Asia, and the Middle East are enthusiastically observing current developments in eager anticipation of new access to energy resources. Finally, the NCP maintains a position of power as it shares the transportation routes with Southern Sudan, but maintains Port Sudan, the only major Sudanese seaport on the Red Sea. There is a critical economic requirement for the NCP to maintain an agreeable wealth sharing arrangement with the GoSS since most of the oil lies in the contested border fields or in Southern Sudan. Conversely, the NCP currently has a monopoly on the distribution of oil, as the main pipeline runs from Southern Sudan through the North to Port Sudan.

History

The purpose of this section is to provide the reader a brief history of Sudan and the events that have catapulted the two regions from European colonial subjects into civil war, and now toward a fragile independent peace. A review of the nation's history is critical to identifying reasons for instability and Sudanese national objectives. For the purpose of this study, the historical review will focus on the period from 1800s to current day Sudan.

Sudan's ties to the Middle East dates back thousands of years as the Northern Africans expanded their search for trade routes, resources, and slaves to the south and

west (Deng 2001). At the time, Egypt used slaves for both manual labor and to fill the ranks of its military, this was the true goal of original Egyptian settlers (Deng 1995). Sudan found many of its Islamic traits from the ruling conquerors of Turko-Egyptian administration of the early 1800s, and again with the Anglo-Egyptian leadership during the Condominium Administration of 1898, which stimulated both the Islamic and Arabic growth in the nation (Deng 1995; Deng 2001).

Egypt and Turkey conquered the northern region of Sudan in 1821. The invaders unified and ruled this region of the nation, enslaving its people and taking its resources. Egypt's claim to the entire sovereignty of Sudan was ineffective, as it really only had the capability of ruling the northern part of the country; the southern region continued to resist outward Egyptian progression (Deng 1995). In order to administer control of the trade, the Egyptians founded the city of Khartoum (current day capital of Sudan). The main objective of the foreigners was to use the North as a base of operations allowing ventures into the south to gather goods and capture slaves. The unanticipated second order effect of this action unified the indigenous northerners and southerners against the foreign rulers (Deng 1995).

The leader of the indigenous population was Dunqulawi Muhammad Ahmad b. _Abdullah (the self-proclaimed Mahdi). Dunqulawi was a religious local, who established himself as the leader of an organization known as the Mahdia (Mirak-Weissbach 1995). The Mahdi used Islam to unify the people of the north against the colonial rulers. Ever after, Islam would remain a substantial religious influence in Sudan. Similarly, the Mahdi's actions also leveraged the support of the tribal south, as they discovered an

opportunity to ally with northerners to overthrow their adversaries. The goal of Mahdia was to end Turkish-Egyptian rule and bring the independence of a Sudan ruled with pure Islam (Mirak-Weissbach 1995).

The Mahdi proclaimed the evil of Turkish-Egyptian rule and garnered support of many tribes for a holy war against the invaders. During one of his lectures in 1881 or 1882, the Mahdi clearly displayed his attempt to inflame Islamic purism and illustrated the conditions burdened upon the people by the slaving elites:

—Verily these Turks thought that theirs was the kingdom and the command of [God's] apostles and of His prophets and of Him who commanded them to imitate them. They judged by other than God's revelation and altered the Shari'a of Our Lord Mohammed, the Apostle of God, and insulted the Faith of God and placed poll-tax [al-jizya] on your necks together with the rest of the Muslims. Verily the Turks used to drag away your men and imprison them in fetters and take captive your women and your children and slay unrighteously the soul under God's protection.” He later continued, —I am the Mahdi, the Successor of the Prophet of God. Cease to pay taxes to the infidel Turks and let everyone who finds a Turk kill him, for the Turks are infidels.” (Mirak-Weissbach 1995)

As the British were the colonial administrator for Egypt, they dispatched Charles Gordon to Sudan, where he negotiated with the Mahdi for peace and unification. The Mahdi rejected his endeavors and killed Gordon in Khartoum in 1885 (Deng 1995). Later that year the Mahdi died, leaving the state to his successor, Khalfia Abdallahi.

On Good Friday in 1898, Herbert Kitchener (soon to be Lord), led a military force of Anglo-Egyptian soldiers to retake Sudan. Khalifa's forces were easily defeated by Kitchener's technologically superior force. On 2 September 1898, Kitchener captured the tomb of the Mahdi, and later killed Khalifa and a number of the surviving lineage of the Mahdi (Chapin Metz 1991). In January 1899, Kitchener's forces signed the Condominium Agreement between England and Egypt, thus solidifying the Anglo-

Egyptian government, ending slavery, and unifying the nation (Mirak-Weissbach 1995; Deng 1995).

A cooperative British and Egyptian administration governed in the period following the expulsion of the Mahdia forces. Governor-General Sir Reginald Wingate managed the supervision as the successor to Lord Kitchener, which he directed from Khartoum. The civilian government was composed of mostly high-level British executives, Egyptians in the middle ranks, and local Sudanese holding lower level positions (Chapin Metz 1991). A fixed taxation occurred based on herd size, land amount, and irrigation requirements. The government also continued the Ottoman separation of civil law and sharia, with a judicial partition under chief justices appointed by the Governor-General. The Sharia law was presided over by Egyptian appointed judges (Chapin Metz 1991).

During the early 1900s, the British began significant development of Sudan's infrastructure. Key expansion in telegraph and rail lines linked critical lines of communication throughout northern Sudan. The Port of Sudan opened to the Red Sea in 1906, significantly improving commerce (Chapin Metz 1991). In order to better develop agriculture and cultivation, the government built the Sudan Plantations Syndicate and a large irrigation dam. This created cotton as the backbone of the country's economy in the early 1900s (Chapin Metz 1991). Conversely, as the north began to develop and prosper, the British government found it difficult to modernize the south and believed that it was not ready to advance. Consequently, the limited attention to the South from the government consisted of military responses to tribal uprisings (Chapin Metz 1991). The

British believed the two regions would have a very difficult time developing along common social and civic lines. Having examined the causes of instability and rebellion against the Turks in the early 1800s, the British allowed Arabic-Islamic culture to continue to thrive in the North, and Africanism to progress in the South. The British acted as a mediator, allowing lines to develop in accordance with their cultures (Deng 1995). However, in the midst of deteriorating relations between local leaders and the assassination of the governor-general of Sudan, Sir Lee Stack in 1924 by an Egyptian nationalist, the British leadership decided to make major changes in administration. The complete withdrawal of all Egyptians from Sudan was ordered and a policy of conducting administration from the North soon followed (Deng 1995).

Sudan developed a divisional administration, ~~as~~ two separated entities, encouraging Arabism and Islam in the North, and isolating the South, leaving it to develop along traditional African lines. While the North developed economically, politically, and socially, the South was neglected” (Deng 2007, 2). With the exception of limited numbers of Christian missionaries (notably the Catholic Verona Fathers, Presbyterians from the US, and missionaries from the Anglican Church Society) providing some health care and education, the South received relatively little consideration from the northern administrators (Chapin Metz 1991). Southern Sudanese continued to have primitive school systems, poor civil service, and reduced wages in comparison to their brethren of the North.

It is clearly noted that the British attempted to keep the two regions intentionally divided. Significant steps were also taken in the 1920-1930s to isolate the South in an attempt to further prevent instability due to the spread of Arabism and Islam to the south.

The British made efforts to revitalize African customs and tribal life that the slave trade had disrupted. Finally, a 1930 directive stated that ~~the~~ blacks in the southern provinces were to be considered a people distinct from northern Muslims and that the region should be prepared for eventual integration with British East Africa” (Chapin Metz 1991).

Nearly 10 years before Sudan gained its independence in 1956, the government decided to reverse the decision of divided development. The British ~~had~~ neither the time nor the political will to put in place constitutional arrangements that would ensure protection for the south in a united Sudan” (Deng 1995, 11). Egypt and England reached a decision to grant independence to Sudan during talks in Cairo in March of 1952 (Malwal 2003). There was much discussion of allowing self-determination for the South, however, in 1952, an unidentified British Foreign Officer informed Sudan’s Civil Secretary: ~~It~~ is not His Majesty’s Government’s policy that the Sudan should be prepared for self-determination by 1953. We must play for time, the job of the British in this country is to delay the day of self-government as long as possible without alienating those Sudanese whose cooperation we cannot afford to lose” (Deng 1995, 93).

Egypt and England, along with representatives from Northern Sudan discussed a division of the new government of Sudan. During these talks, England intentionally failed to represent Southern Sudanese desires for independent development. This failure, in conjunction with the newly established Northern Arab power base, created anger and

resentment from Southerners towards the Arab-Islamic North (Malwal 2003).

Furthermore, this allowed the Egyptians to maintain their close Arab-Islamic relations with the North, a relationship still existing today (Malwal 2003).

The North-South conflict started in 1955, with fears of potential northern domination, and a return to slavery after the British turned over the country to Khartoum on 1 January 1956. The notion for separation was first officially addressed in 1963, after Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, failed to provide equality to citizens in the South (Deng 2007). The North suppressed any Southern call for a federalist government and succession, and began imprisoning federalist advocates (Deng 1995). The Southerners' shouts for attention were met with stiff, violent resistance from the NCP, and during early nationhood a number of massacres were conducted by the North in Juba (capitol of Southern Sudan) and Wau. These attacks focused on southern intellectuals with a culminating goal of creating one government unified by Arabism and Islam (Akol 2010 , 3).

Dr. Mansour Khalid, a member of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement Political Bureau and former foreign minister of Sudan, noted NCP actions at the time: "National unity and integration were . . . to be achieved by assimilating the south into the Islamic and Arab culture of the north. No room was to be allowed for culture diversity, and any dissent was to be ruthlessly suppressed by military force" (Deng 1995, 148-149). This initial conflict would last until the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972, ultimately killing over 1 million people and creating another 1 million IDP (Deng 2007).

The Addis Ababa Agreement peace accord was recognized in 1972, giving Southern Sudan semi-autonomous administration of the region and temporarily ending the war (Deng 2007). By all accounts this agreement worked well until 1982, when the NCP government changed its mind and revoked the Addis Ababa Agreement in a gradual move to re-impose Islamic law on the entire nation (Malwal 2003). This perceived treachery by the North received little attention from the international community, and is cited as being the true genesis of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and its military arm, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) (Malwal 2003).

President Nimeiri's dismissal of the agreement would ultimately be the fuel to feed the fire of war for the next 21 years, until the signing of the CPA in 2005. This conflict would develop into the continent's longest running war. Its loss and suffering would take the lives of nearly a million people, and create millions of IDP and refugees.

In 1989, the country's civil stability would again decline as General Omar Hassan El-Bashir, the leader of a regime of fundamentalist Muslims known as the National Islamic Front, took control of the NCP government through a military coup in Khartoum (Malwal 2003). Perceptions from Africans in the South was that Northern domination, slavery, genocide, and life as second and third class citizens were to be the future product of the new Bashir led Sudanese government (Malwal 2003.).

The National Islamic Front government, which ousted the democratically elected civilian government in 1989 pursued war in the Southern Sudan with vigor. Previous governments both civilian and military, had rejected southern demands for autonomy and equality. Northern political leaders for decades treated southerners as second-class citizens and did not see the south as an integral part of the country. (Dagne 2010, 14)

This would again set the stage for full violence from both SPLA and the Northern Sudanese Armed Forces. Additionally, numerous guerrilla organizations from both the North and the South would act subordately and at times autonomously from their government leadership to create mayhem and instability.

With the war waging, a number of negotiations still took place from 1993 through 2004. At one point, after significant, yet indecisive and non-victorious military action, the North decided to grant the South the right of self-determination (Malwal 2003). This was unsuccessful due to the fact that the North included stipulations which the South viewed as unacceptable. Other peace accords were unsuccessfully attempted. None came to fruition until the 2005 CPA.

The 2005 CPA finds its genesis in the Machakos cease-fire agreement, signed in mid-2002. This agreement essentially created a six year cooling down period for the two regions. Furthermore, it established semi-autonomous rule and recognized the two separate governments: the GoSS and NCP. This agreement also addressed wealth sharing for the newfound oil revenue, and development of separate defense forces. The agreement would ultimately culminate with a vote to either adopt the system of government established by the peace agreement or for Southern independence in January 2011 (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development 2004; Shankleman 2006).

Background: Sudan, Issues Influencing Instability

The foundations for the condescension between the people of Northern and Southern Sudan may very likely find its base in the British and Egyptian rulers who colonialized Sudan prior to it becoming an independent nation in 1956 (Dagne 2010).

The North continued to propel the racism and dominance forward as they took possession of the nation. For instance, as jobs were Sudanized from the British, southerners received less than one percent of the newly available positions; only six of the nearly eight-hundred government positions were made available to the South (Akol 2010).

While much has been made of the religious division between the two regions, the bigger issues are really racism, slavery, failure to be seen as intellectual equals, and the lack of governmental representation. This tension runs so deep, that after the departure of British rule, it is believed that the initial southern rebellion was a product of fears about the return of slavery and dominance from the northern Arabs over the South (Deng 2007). Equality issues fueled the conflict well into the 1970s, until the country discovered oil.

While the CPA ended the almost forty years of war, it failed to clearly identify a border dividing the two regions. This issue would take center stage as resources became more viable in the region. The 2005 agreement did specify that the North-South border, as defined on 1 January 1956, the day of Sudan's independence, would be the recognized border. Unfortunately, documentation on that border is incomplete and leaves much room for interpretation. The border itself is extremely porous. It is also heavily traveled by the migrant population and military patrolling (International Crisis Group 2010). Increasing tensions in border regions are exacerbated by the Sudanese Armed Forces and SPLA forces failing to completely withdraw or recognize demarkation zones (International Crisis Group 2008). Coupled with these regional militaries are guerrilla organizations which are influencing the area by terrorizing and exerting violence on unprotected

villages and IDP camps (Dagne 2010). The SPA and other guerrilla organizations attempted to influence CPA votes in the region by using violence and terrorism on the border locals. Ultimately while many died in resistance, the CPA vote carried, however the tension is still strong and violence still occurs (Dagne 2010; International Crisis Group 2010).

Many of the contested regions also possess noteworthy regional economic impact. As recently as September of 2010, a state splitting the North-South border called Abyei, was once again under dispute as to the exact regional lines of demarkation. The renewed dispute is generated due to its plentiful oil deposits. This province had already suffered years of conflict and genocide, its people are once again concerned about the grave threat introduced by northern pressures to repopulate the region (Winter 2010). Major oil reserves, fertile agricultural lands, water resources, and livestock feeding grounds continue to be increasingly significant issues as Northern dependence on these resources grows in the bordering regions (Deng 2007; International Crisis Group 2010).

Background: US History, Policies, and Issues

For a country that has traditionally not been of particular US strategic interest, Sudan has received much attention recently. The US initially sided with Sudan during the Cold War, mainly to reduce the influence of the Soviet Union in Africa; however, after the US displayed allegiance to the Israelis in the 1967 Six Day War, US-Sudanese relations declined (Brown 2003). After making some headway in the 1970s to rekindle the relationship, affairs took a devastating turn for the worse in 1973, when the Black September Palestinian terrorists assassinated US Ambassador Cleo Noel and his deputy,

George Moore, in Khartoum (US Department of State 2010a; Deng 1995). Strained affairs followed after Sudanese released the captured terrorists back to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (Deng 1995).

During the late 1970s and 1980s, relations slowly improved and the Sudanese-US affiliation became closer. The US gained a strong strategic partner in Africa, one that would become a large recipient of US aid and military development assistance in sub-Saharan Africa (Brown 2003). By 1984, the US was Sudan's largest aid supplier, providing \$184 million annually. This bond quickly deteriorated as Sudan defaulted on US loans, and political posturing by the NCP sided with Libyan and extremist Islamic visions, which failed to align with US interests (Congress 1991). In 1989, when General Bashir's radical Islamic coup overthrew Sudan's democratic government, the US again diplomatically withdrew and enacted a number of economic sanctions against Sudan (Brown 2003). With the exception of humanitarian assistance, the sanctions prohibited any commercial exchange between Sudan and the US (Monroe 2006).

During the 1990s, Sudan provided refuge to notable terrorists such as, Carlos —the Jackal,” Osama Bin Laden, and Abu Nidal (US Department of State 2010). The Islamic government of Sudan also

allied with Tunisia's banned Ennahda Party, Egypt's Islamic Jihad Organization, Arab-Afghan Mujahedeen, Lebanon's Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Al Ittihad al-Islamiyya of Somalia, the Ethiopia Islamic Jihad, the Tunisian Resistance Party, the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front, the Algerian Renunciation and Repudiation Group, Abu-Nidahl Organization, Abu Jihad Group, among other insurgents such as the Uganda's Lord's Resistance Army. (Brown 2003 14-15)

Needless to say, these new associations established a critical strategic concern for the US, and in 1993, Sudan received recognition as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism” (US Department of State 2009)

To the astonishment of the US Government, in May 2000 Sudan initiated bilateral dialogue on counter terrorism efforts, and since 11 September 2001, they have provided “concrete cooperation” in the war against terrorism (Monroe 2006, 5).

According to the US Department of State (DOS):

Sudan remained a cooperative partner in global counterterrorism efforts. During the past year, the Sudanese government continued to pursue terrorist operations directly involving threats to U.S. interests and personnel in Sudan. Sudanese officials have indicated that they view their continued cooperation with the United States as important and recognize the benefits of U.S. training and information-sharing. Though the counterterrorism relationship remained solid, some hard-line Sudanese officials continued to express resentment and distrust over actions by the USG and questioned the benefits of the bilateral cooperation. (US Department of State 2009, 1)

The DOS further concluded in the report, that while much progress and support has been made, the government of Sudan still offers indirect support to many terrorists, conceivably including those in Darfur. There is also evidence of direct arms support to Hamas, which the Sudanese government currently recognizes as freedom fighters (Ibid.). Most likely for the above reasons, the DOS has refrained from removing the 17 year old designation of State Sponsor of Terrorism, even though this nation continues to be supportive of US interests in combating global terrorism.

President Obama outlined his new policy for Sudan in October 2009. His focus included “to end the conflict in Darfur; implementation of the CPA; and ensuring Sudan does not become a safe haven for international terrorist groups” (Dagne 2010).

Additionally, former US Presidential envoy to Sudan, Scott Gration, stated in press

reports that the US's primary objective is ~~a~~ definitive end to conflict, gross human right abuses, and genocide in Darfur" (Dagne 2010).

In particular reference to the Southern Sudan situation, Mr. Gration stated ~~whether~~ they secede or whether they still stay unified, the South still needs to have better governance, better security, better agriculture, better education, better delivery of public sector services, and so we're continuing to build those." He continued with ~~that~~ of us have a large role and things that we can do to make sure that Sudan is either successful as a whole or as two countries hopefully at peace with each other. The administration is not choosing sides" (Kaufman 2010).

US African Command

In 2008 the US created a sixth geographic combatant command, US Africa Command (AFRICOM). This new regional command assumes responsibility for areas in Africa formerly under the jurisdiction of the US European Command and US Central Command. The development of this new command comes as the US identifies emerging opportunities and threats in Africa. It is this command which now monitors and influences military issues in Sudan.

The assigned mission of US AFRICOM is to work with the US government partners, international partners, and the 53 nations (54 with Southern Sudan) in its Africa jurisdiction to conduct ~~sustained~~ security engagement through military-to-military programs, military sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of US foreign policy" (US AFRICOM 2010). Key to AFRICOM's role in Africa will be building partner capacity,

through enabling regional governments and organizations to develop the capability to secure and stabilize their own nations.

Primary Research Question

As Southern Sudan transitions to an independent nation, how should the US military posture to reduce and respond to internal and external factors causing regional instability.

Secondary Research Questions

These secondary research questions will be answered to the support the Primary Research Question. These questions are listed in order to display the problem, actors and options available.

1. What are the internal and external influences on Sudan's stability?
2. Who are the international actors influencing Sudan's stability?
3. How is the US employing its instruments of power in Sudan?
4. What is the risk vs. reward of US military options?

Significance

Since the 9 January 2011 CPA referendum, and South Sudan's decision to secede, state and non-state actors will position in Sudan for advantage. Whether cultural or racial tension, human trafficking, agricultural concerns, water rights, balance of government power, or mineral commodities, Sudan's tribulations have many spectators and active players in both the region and the world.

Specifically, the US is concerned with denying terrorist safe havens and ensuring regional stability. In order to accomplish these goals, the US must determine who the actors are, what their motivations are, and what influence they can have on the situation in Sudan. How can the US military, looking to benefit from a stable Sudan, posture to reduce volatility the region? Failing to investigate these issues and the potential to be prepared for future operations in Sudan may prevent the US from taking advantage of opportunities to stabilize and promote foreign policy in Africa. Furthermore, other consequences may have considerable economic and humanitarian repercussions.

Assumptions

The development of this paper incorporated the following assumptions:

1. Regional stability is in the best interest of the US government.
2. The US is willing to posture and, if necessary, apply Diplomatic, Informational, Military, or Economic (DIME) instruments of power, with a focus on military power, to influence that stability.
3. The region of Abyei will also vote regarding whether or not to secede, and this decision will have a profound impact on the stability in both North and South Sudan.

Limitations

The author does not anticipate the opportunity to discuss the nature of this research with all, or even a significant portion, of the Sudanese resident experts. Most information will come through open source data and third party reports. Due to the classification of AFRICOM and DOS policy and plans, this paper will not utilize information from either of those sources.

Delimitations

While a great deal of information is available in the ~~secret~~ and higher security clearance levels, this paper will not exceed the classification level of ~~unclassified~~.” Additionally, while the conflict in Darfur has significant impact in greater Sudan, it is the belief of the author that this issue can be separated from the secession of Northern and Southern Sudan. For the purpose of this paper, a conscious effort has been taken to remove references and issues related to Darfur, thereby limiting the scope of this research paper.

Conclusion

This chapter introduced the situation in Sudan and briefly reviewed the nation’s history. Additionally, the chapter identified the pertinent issues and background of Sudan and the study’s primary and secondary research questions. Finally, the researcher disclosed the significance of the topic, the assumptions, limitations, and delimitations of the study.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

This chapter will review pertinent background information on the crisis in Sudan, issues and options. The review of literature will attempt to address and answer the secondary research questions. Those questions are:

1. What are the internal and external influences on Sudan's stability?
2. Who are the international actors influencing Sudan's stability?
3. How is the US employing its instruments of power in Sudan?
4. What is the risk vs. reward of US military options? This question will be specifically addressed in chapter 4.

Due to the interconnectivity of the subject and the questions, it is more efficient and comprehensible to present the related works grouped by nation or organization, and not by research question; however, when possible reviews were addressed by question.

What are the internal and external influences on Sudan's stability?

Culture

Francis Deng, the recently appointed United Nations (UN) Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide, and former Sudanese Minister of State Foreign Affairs, discussed causes for Sudan's instability. In his 1995 book *War of Visions*, Deng identifies a number of factors that influence the instability and tension between the North and South regions of Sudan. Much of this dates back to the historical issues as described in the first chapter of this document. Some of the factors influencing the division are racism,

religious hegemony, influence from foreign governments, and desires for self-identification.

According to Deng, a desire for self-determination is at the root of the conflict in Sudan. After years of bloodshed, and millions of refugees and IDP, the South is convinced that people of the North will never be able to accept them as equals. The people of the southern region, which until very recently, were considered uneducated, unproductive, and really only having value insofar as they were slaves to the ruling North, are now seeking autonomy. The following excerpt from a document entitled “What we fight for in South Sudan” illustrates the mindset of Southern Sudanese:

The goal of our struggle is . . . the right of self-determination for our people. We want our people to be able of its own free will and under no threat or fear, to determine its destiny, either to remain in a unitary Sudan as a truly autonomous region, or to have nothing whatsoever to do with the North and tie our future with that of our African brothers in their states on our Southern borders. . . . Our specifically African-as distinct from Arab-identity and the common aspirations which united all our tribes in a common struggle fully qualify us for nationhood and the right of self-determination . . . by rejecting the attempted Arabization of Southern Sudan and by adhering to our African identity and heritage we exercise a basic human right which is bound to be a recognized by everybody sooner or later . . . by waging our own war of liberation we also block Arab and Russian imperialist expansion southwards and protect our brothers in East and Central Africa. (Deng 1995, 141)

Conversely, Deng illustrates that the North views the South as a region of people that can benefit from the governance and order instilled by both Arabization and Islam. The Northern people are extremely proud of their ethnic background and have continually referred to the fact that the culturally African regions in Southern Sudan are tribally backwards, humiliatingly primitive and in need of direction and Arab-Islamic ruling (Deng 1995). At the 1965 Round Table Conference, Sayed Ismail al-Azhari (first prime minister and later president) stated:

I feel at this juncture obliged to declare that we are proud of our Arab origin, our Arabism and being Moslems. The Arabs came to this continent, as pioneers, to disseminate a genuine culture, and promote sound principles which have shed enlightenment and civilization throughout Africa at a time when Europe was plunged into the abyss of darkness, ignorance and doctrinal and scholarly backwardness. It is our ancestors who held the torch high and led the caravan of liberation and advancement; and it is they who provided superior melting-pot for Greek, Persian and Indian culture, giving them the chance to react with all that was noble in Arab culture, and handing them back to the rest of the world as a guide to those who wished to extend the frontiers of learning. (Deng 1995, 421)

Later in 1966 Sayed was quoted stating ~~the~~ dominate feature of our nation is an Islamic one . . . and this Nation will not have its entity identified and its prestige and pride preserved except under an Islamic revival” (Deng 1995, 418). Finally, it is worth acknowledging, that the people of the North believe that Southern roots in Christianity are fragile and weak, and that with proper indoctrination and assimilation, the North can overcome Southern Africanism (Deng 2001).

North-South perspectives are touched with a slightly different perspective by Peter Woodward, in his editorial *Islam, Radicalism, and Nationalism in Sudanese Politics Before Independence*. Woodward describes the issue as a conflict between Northern Sudanese nationalism and Southern radicalism. He claims that these links precede independence, and that they actually began in the 1930s, when Southern policy created ~~restless~~ “troublemakers” in the south, which were attempting to isolate the North and South through fear of nationalist politics (Woodward 1983).

He argues that the cause for the degraded education in pre-independent Southern Sudan was a deliberate action taken by the North, with concerns that British authorities would continue to partition the country, and the southern region would fall under Britain’s East African colonies (Woodward 1983). As that notion passed, the North

attempted to develop the backwards South, rather brutally at times, by creating opportunity through Arabic language and Arab-Islamic governance, which the South ultimately refused (Woodward 1983). Woodward continued to describe:

Discontent in the South rose, especially during the self-governing period, from 1954-1956, and culminated in the Southern mutiny and related disturbances in August 1955 . . . [T]he South then appears to have been driven by northern Sudanese nationalism, first into demands for radical change of the structure of government that would give the region a special status, and finally into armed conflict, before the goal was finally conceded at Addis Ababa in 1972. (Woodward 1983, 107).

Resources

While there are a number of issues in contention in Sudan during this period of determination, no resource concerns are more profound than the rights for selling and distributing oil. In 1979, American oil company Chevron discovered oil on the border between Darfur and Kordofan. Major discoveries in other regions of Sudan soon followed (Obi 2007). This discovery led to conflict between the North and South, incited by an attempt of the North to redraw boundary lines. Eventually, the conflict resulted in the death of several oil workers and caused Chevron's retreat from Sudan in 1992 (Obi 2007). This prevented full maturation of the oil industry until much later.

With tensions still high, Sudan first began exporting oil, with assistance from the Chinese, in late 2000, and with this new trade also created a new variable and inevitable continuation of the conflict (Brown 2003). Shortly after its production went into full operation, Sudan recorded its first trade surplus in 20 years, and by 2002 crude oil revenue accounted for 39 percent of Sudan's revenue and 52 percent in 2004 (Shankleman 2006). Astonishingly today, more than 60 percent of Northern Sudan's and 98 percent of Southern Sudan's budget is generated through oil related revenues, thus

creating a mutual dependency between both nations regarding the successful drilling and distribution of oil (Pointet 2010).

In the Danish Institute for International Studies report of 2007, on “Oil Development in Africa,” Cyril Obi discusses that decision makers need to pay particular attention to oil as a source of power, both because of the wealth it produces and the potential to cause conflict. While oil has been described as a curse to many fragile democratic nations, it must also be mentioned that the resource itself does not cause the conflict, but it is the way(s) in which they are constructed, transformed (produced), distributed and mediated through market and power relations by certain interests that lead to conflict” (Obi 2007, 15).

The concern with the impact of oil on the conflict in Sudan is that this new variable is not necessarily developing a new potential conflict; it is, in a way, fueling the long burning violence which may have been near culmination. Additionally, by providing new avenues to fund the conflict, it may also encourage an economic reason to continue hostilities. This situation is described by Bona Malwal in the 2003 writing “The Sudan: Negotiating a Settlement”:

As the century came to an end, it was clear that this issue was likely to fuel the war, complicate negotiations, and reduce chances of a peaceful resolution. On the one hand, it seemed unlikely that Southern Sudan would agree to end the war unless it were recognized as the principal owner of the oil. On the other hand, the North now had all the more reason to want to control the South. (Malwal 2003, 174)

To further clarify the issue, it may be important to recognize that Southern Sudan accounts for production of over 80 percent of Sudan’s almost 487,000 barrels of oil per day (bbl/day), and is forecasting a planned 2011 output of 650,000 bbl/day. Sudan cannot

consume the majority of this oil and can obviously benefit through its export (Central Intelligence Agency n.d.; Mazen and Shahine 2010).

In her 2006 book *Oil, Profits, and Peace*, Jill Shankleman discusses the impact of resources on peace, stability, and conflict in Sudan. According to Shankleman, the World Bank confirmed the views of many commentators, stating that oil had emerged as one of the major factors that keeps the war going . . . [S]udanese government spending on defense and security in 2002 was estimated at around \$1 million per day, government oil revenues at around \$1 billion a year” (Shankleman 2006, 125). We can infer that oil is helping fund the war machine. With the excess amount of oil available for distribution (see figure 1), both regions have a stake in gaining dominance over the oil distribution and ownership.




Figure 1. Sudan's Oil Production and Consumption
Source: Energy Information Administration, *Country Analysis Brief: Sudan*
<http://www.eia.gov/cabs/Sudan/pdf.pdf> (accessed 4 June 2011), 3.

As the nation tremulously developed the framework for peace in the early 2000s, the national concerns became oil field locations, transportation and manufacturing, and distribution. These are all the concerns listed by Obi, which he claims, have the greatest potential to lead to conflict. Fortunately, the 2005 CPA clearly identifies these issues and outlines the principles and rules for wealth sharing in the nation.

For the purpose of this study, the author will only identify a small portion of relevant CPA sections pertinent to the immediate discussion of oil revenue and wealth sharing.

Section 1.2 of the CPA states: The wealth of Sudan shall be shared equitably so as to enable each level of government to discharge its legal and constitutional responsibilities and duties.

Section 1.7: Southern Sudan, and those areas in need of construction/reconstruction, shall be brought up to the same average level of socio-economic and public services standard as the Northern states. To achieve these objectives will take time and effort to build up local institutional, human, and economic capacity. For this purpose, two special funds shall be established as provided herein.

Section 5.6: After payment of the Oil Revenue Stabilization Account and to the oil producing states/regions, fifty percent (50%) of net oil revenue derived from oil producing wells in Southern Sudan shall be allocated to the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) as of the beginning of the Pre-Interim Period and the remaining fifty percent (50%) to the National Government and States in Northern Sudan. (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development 2004, 47, 54)

According to Shankleman the wealth sharing provisions are extremely controversial with people in the Northern and Southern regions alike. Both sides believe that the other is receiving the losing side in the negotiation. The Northern people believe that the sovereign nation should not be extorted by one of its states, and the untrusting citizens of the South believe that its region is being raped of its resources in support of a

government which fails to adequately represent its interests. Shankleman discusses popular perspectives on the CPA shortly after its release:

As soon as the agreement was published, articles emerged in the Northern press criticizing the decisions to “give away” wealth; opinion polls in Southern Sudan found wealth sharing to be one of four major areas of concern about the peace accords. Some challenge the overall north-south division; others argue that the bulk of revenues should go to the people who live in the localities where oil is produced. (Shankleman 2006, 126)

Malwal tends to see the issue as a serious point of North-South controversy as well. He cites that, historically the NCP of the North has used wealth gained from resource exploitation to improve its war fighting capabilities, which, traditionally, they have employed against the South (Malwal 2003, 176). With the perceived established track record of the two regions, wavering trust issues are understandable.

International actors influencing Sudan's stability

For a country which ranks 70 of 227 for gross domestic product, Sudan has drawn enormous attention in recent years (Central Intelligence Agency n.d.). Since establishing itself as an independent nation, Sudan has seen considerable interest from external influencers such as Canada, the US, Qatar, China, Malaysia, and its African neighbors (Lado n.d.). Most of these players are attracted to Sudan due to its mineral and economic interests. Some are concerned with the impacts of the crumbling regional stability, and still others are concerned about the impact of Islamic extremists and the nation's future as a terrorist safe-haven. For the purpose this paper, the author will discuss the impact of three external nations in particular: the United States of America, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and the Arab Republic of Egypt. These three nations were selected because of their overwhelming influence on Sudan. Egypt has played a major role in the

cultural development of Sudan, while the PRC and US have provided an disproportionate amount of foreign aid for Sudanese humanitarian and economic development, especially when compared to the rest of the international community.

Egypt

Of the three main external influencing nations, Egypt has impacted Sudan for the greatest period of time, and thus, has provided significant influence on stability in Sudan. In his book, Deng discusses the impact of Egypt on the slave trade, the initial influence and foundation of Arabic and Islamic beliefs, and the major impact of the Six-Day War of 1967 on uniting the entire Arab community (Deng 1995).

There is a belief, according to Deng, that in early independent Sudan, an internal struggle was taking place. Balance was difficult to obtain between this new African nation with Arab-Islamic values, developing on its own accord, and the elitist's perception of Sudan's Arab ties to Egypt, a nation acting as the beacon for Arab culture. A common global belief in the mid-1960s, was that Egypt was the superior Arab power and Sudan should harness its prestigious cultural heritage to that of Egypt (Deng 1995).

Malwal likewise describes the modern connection between the two nations. The Egyptian government respects and works relatively well with the NCP, due to both mutual religious foundations and a co-dependent economic well-being. However, the Egyptians seem to support the Arab-Islamic Northern rule, and they support the dominant racial prejudice, regardless of economic concerns (Malwal 2003, 173).

While the Egyptians grow increasingly less tolerant of the political complexities between the North and South, they did display increasing support to the Northern position

prior to the referendum. Malwal believes that while Egypt does not support radical Islamic attitudes, it does believe in, and support non-extreme Islamic models as a way to fight the radicalism. Malwal believes the Egyptian government will continue to support the NCP post-referendum (Malwal 2003, 173). It would be premature at this point to asses that recent political changes in Egypt, with the overthrow of President Mubarak, will lead to any significant changes in the relationships between the two nations.

The Nile

Of critical importance to Egypt is the secure, uninterrupted flow of the Nile river. The Nile, which flows through Rwanda, Uganda, and Sudan is the life blood of Egypt. In 2000, the Nile provided Egypt 78 percent of its 74 billion cubic meters of water (Hvidt 2000). Straining this precious resource is increased urbanization, expanding agricultural development, and improved standards of living in Egypt (Hvidt 2000; Central Intelligence Agency n.d.). An important reason for the issues listed above is Egypt has seen a population growth from approximately 55 million in 1994 to nearly 82 million in 2011 (Hvidt 2000). Malwal illustrates Egyptian concern regarding the development of a new Southern Sudanese nation in his paper:

Egyptians, not unnaturally, are very sensitive about control of the Nile, which is the lifeblood of their country. They fear that new projects developed upstream might restrict their own use of the Nile's water, and they feel threatened by the idea that a new state might form in the region, especially one with which they have no close religious or cultural ties. (Malwal 2003, 172)

While it is clear that Egypt has a vital interest in the Nile, Malwal argues that its fear may be unfounded with regard to the situation in Sudan. In contrast to Egypt's annual rainfall of 3.5 inches, Southern Sudan receives over 40 inches annually, which is

also nearly four times the amount of Northern Sudan. As Malwal points out —Northern Sudan, in contrast competes with Egypt for its share of the Nile's waters, which it, too needs for irrigation purposes. As population growth in both Northern Sudan and Egypt spiral out of control, the division of the Nile's waters between them is likely to produce more problems than can be managed" (Malwal 2003, 172).

China

The PRC has taken a keen interest in Africa, but specifically in Sudan. Currently China acquires more oil from Sudan than any of its other energy partners, save Kazakhstan (Paterno 2009). According to a recent US Congressional research report on the Sudanese-Chinese arrangement, China is importing roughly 64 percent of Sudan's oil (Paterno 2009). This is a relationship which is bound to continue as China continues to expand. —While China today accounts for only less than 10 percent of global oil consumption, estimates are that China's share of world oil consumption will double in the next 15 years" (Jakobson and Daojiong 2006, 64).

Dennis Tull has written a number of articles on China's actions and impacts in modern day Africa. In his 2006 paper, the —Political Consequences of China's Return to Africa," Tull discusses the global economic power which the PRC has become, and how its engagement is really one of mutual benefit in the Sino-African relationship. Tull believes that Chinese interest in Africa, and in Sudan, is caused by three key events: —firstly, it is based on China's enormous economic success story over the past two decades," next, —practical economic necessities convinced the Chinese leadership to embark on a more active foreign policy," thereby, —regional and international stability

were increasingly perceived a critical factor of continued domestic economic growth.” Finally, ~~the~~ emergence of the uncontested hegemony of the United States at the end of the Cold War also provided stimulus for a reinvigorated foreign policy” (Tull 2008, 113-114).

Tull further illustrates that the business relationship with China provides Sudan a number of advantages, which includes access to technologically superior military equipment, financial trade, and a protective voice in the UN (with proxy representation from one of the five permanent UN Security Council members) (Tull 2008). According to Tull, using its power in the UN, China has blocked several attempts to enforce UN sanctions on the Sudanese government during its recent conflicts in Darfur. Additionally, depending on the possible outcome, China has either abstained or threatened to veto UN propositions, in cases when its business partner’s interests were at stake (Tull 2008).

As Jakobson and Daojiong identified in their commentary, ~~China~~ and the Worldwide Search for Oil,” the Chinese take an international position with governments in conflict which impacts both human rights and the ability of the international community to employ sanctions against those countries. In the last 20 years China has developed a non-interference approach to conducting negotiations with countries having questionable domestic issues (Jakobson and Daojiong 2006).

By ignoring the ethnic and religious complexities of African societies and changes in African governance over the past two decades, ~~China~~ runs the risk of presenting itself merely as an interloper bent on short-term economic gain. In Sudan, China cannot escape from being viewed as supporting the Bashir government that is

refusing effective outside intervention from either the African Union (AU) or the UN peacekeeping force to alleviate the ongoing humanitarian crisis” (Jakobson and Daojiong 2006, 68).

Tull correspondingly describes this Chinese-African position in his paper: ~~no~~ political conditions like respect for human rights are attached to the development assistance it provides to African countries. According to Premier Wen Jiabao, the Chinese government believes that African countries have the right and capability to solve their own problems” (Tull 2008, 119). Tull continues, —Beijing’s close ties to the regimes in Sudan and Zimbabwe have received particular attention. Increasingly isolated by Western states because of human rights abuses, both Khartoum and Harare have turned to China as an alternative source of aid, trade, investment and diplomatic backing” (Tull 2008, 122).

The PRC continues to provide economic aid, infrastructure development, and technological assistance to Sudan. China has constructed a new refinery, an almost 1,000 mile long pipeline, and in 2007, invested heavily in upgrading the rail system in support of its energy concerns (Dagne 2010). Furthermore, according to an April 2010 Congressional Research Paper, China not only has provided economic aid and development, but has also been accused of being the principle supplier of military weapons to the government of Sudan, an act which violates the UN weapons embargo (Dagne 2010). Specifically, ~~in~~ 2005, China reportedly sold Sudan \$24 million in arms and ammunition and \$57 million worth of spare parts for aircraft and helicopters.”

(Dagne 2010, 11). In 2008, numerous Chinese vehicles and fighter aircraft were also used in attacks in contested regions of western Sudan (Dagne 2010).

In Peter Navarro's book, *The Coming China Wars: Where They Will be Fought and How They Can be Won*, he describes a number of destabilizing factors which China is either neglecting to consider or ignorantly overlooking. Navarro also captures the dual impact of the China-Sudan relationship as an economic relation of both oil and arms. Navarro claims that China is supplying small arms, helicopters, fighter aircraft, and surface to surface missiles, in exchange for favorable oil rights (Navarro 2007).

Navarro continues, that while putting thousands of Chinese professionals and laborers to work with African infrastructure development, in what he refers to as weapons of mass construction and a global economic strategy, this also acts to destabilize the nation's natural capability to generate economic strength.

In effect, then China is using foreign aid and the promise of capital investment to leverage one-sided "joint-ventures" for massive resource extraction operations. In the process, it systematically strips nations of their raw materials and natural resources while recovering the costs of these resources and materials by dumping cheap finished goods into these same countries-often driving out local indigenous labor and driving up the local unemployment rate. (Navarro 2007, 91)

It can be argued that this is a temporary mutually beneficial arrangement between China and Sudan, and the potential to fiscally advance the impoverished Sudan is of chief concern for any local politician, regardless of long term economic effects. The dispute many have is that China's militaristic approach to economic growth, foreign relations, and its non-interference attitude is likely to inhibit Sudanese, UN, and AU intentions for conflict resolution.

United States

As described in the earlier chapter, historically US-Sudanese relations have been strained. However, there are a number of noteworthy reasons obligating US involvement in Sudan. According to a Crisis Panel Report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, foundations for US trepidations in Sudan are: (1) its current financial investments, (2) Sudan's active and passive roles in terrorism, and the future of such roles as an increasingly failing state, and (3) the US government's pledge of democracy and openness being introduced into the Middle East and Islamic nations (Esposito and Crocker 2004).

In a recent Small Wars Journal paper, "Southern Sudan—The Four Theses," a strategic plans officer with US AFRICOM, Lt Col Thomas Talley, discusses the US' ambiguous position. He presents that the US is committed to following through on the peace process due to its staunch support during the development of the CPA. As he describes, the CPA is "the tie that binds the US to whatever happens next (in Sudan)! The U.S. played a considerable role in helping broker the CPA—in the eyes of the world, the U.S. owns the peace process" (Talley 2010, 4). While the implementation of the CPA in 2004 and 2005 eased the torn African nation away from war, it also molded a binding obligation for the US to ensure regional peace. "The resulting peace agreement allowed the Bush administration to claim a victory—it stopped a war without having to use military force! But we fail to see that our success was less about our leverage and more about our timing" (Talley 2010, 4). Talley continues to reference the ensuing impasse created as exhausted military forces in both the North and South continued to wage war with the absence of achieving any operational level goals. Both forces had militarily culminated,

the US and CPA presented themselves at a point when conflict was no longer a legitimate option.

One does not have to reminisce too far back to picture the dominant global position of the US in the early 2000s. The US drafted the Bush doctrine, setting a precedent of allowing preemptive military strike in the prevention of war. Militarily, the US virtually decimated both the Taliban and the Iraqi National Army, simultaneously. Perhaps most important, the US still carried public support as Iraq had not yet fully achieved de-baathification - the Iraqi insurgency was still at its genesis.

The US carried significant international credibility, and militarily was not afraid to use it. President Bush may have also had some interest to act due to the embarrassing memory of US failure to act during the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Unfortunately, ~~the~~ apparent strength of the US, and its perceived ability to intervene forcefully in foreign affairs, is considerably less in 2010 than in 2005. The most obvious examples of relative decline . . . are the recession . . . and the fact that the US is still engaged in two land wars.” (Talley 2010, 6). For these reasons, the US owns the peace process, needs it to succeed, but has neither the political stomach, nor the deep pockets to support full-spectrum operations into a third-world country which offers questionable financial return.

Current US Position

In recent years the US-Sudan relationship has developed more or less positively. Past political problems still influence and prevent full engagement; however, the US is striving to make positive strategic influences in the region. In his recent paper, ~~–The~~ United States of America and the Peoples Republic of China in Africa: Promoting

stability or chaos?” Major Fredrick Dankyi Ntiri addresses US-Sudanese relations through the lens of DIME. Diplomatically, he claims that US interest is only in humanitarian assistance programs and atrocities in the Darfur region. He cites recent special envoys, UN pressure, and pressure on the NCP (Ntiri 2007). Ntiri’s popular view is shared by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, which agrees that US economic and diplomatic efforts by top level officials, including the President and Secretary of State, have put significant pressure on the UN and the international community (Esposito and Crocker 2004). While genuine, these efforts also serve the US interests in deterring terrorism and developing stability, and continue to display the US’ commitment to multilateralism (Esposito and Crocker 2004).

Militarily, Ntiri claims that US efforts are only indirectly linked through third country partner nations and some limited direct training opportunities (Ntiri 2007). While the introduction of US AFRICOM is a significant step for US military operations in Africa, it is yet to be seen how the new combatant command will influence nations in its area of responsibility, specifically Sudan.

In a recent US Army War College research paper, “U.S. strategy towards Sudan and its impact on the U.S. military,” Colonel Bartley Ives identifies that militarily, other than Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa and AFRICOM, US forces in Africa are relatively limited. He further specifies a number of issues associated with applying military power in the region, such as the lack of personnel and geographic separation between US main troop areas and the potential areas of conflict (Ives 2010). According to Ives, the perception and ability of the US military influence appears inadequate.

Unfortunately, Ntiri almost completely fails to address the other two areas of national power; information and economic impact in relation to the US influence on Sudan. His limited explanation regarding the economic use of power, is that presidentially mandated withdrawal of US industry, companies and investments in these areas have only made other external states, such as the PRC, more influential and Sudan more dependent on them for survival.

Conversely, the economic assistance from the US has been significant. It has reached out with aid, and ~~pr~~provided more than \$5 billion in humanitarian and development assistance to Sudan since 2004. In FY 2009, the United States provided \$936.9 million in humanitarian assistance to Sudan and eastern Chad” (Dagne 2010, 23). ~~In~~ examining what elements of national power the United States plans on expending in this conflict resolution effort, the key implementation elements appear to address primarily diplomacy and economic support in the way of funding.” (Ives 2010, 6).

Conclusion

This chapter reviewed the background information on the Sudan crisis and some of the pertinent surrounding issues and options. It directly addressed a number of experts’ perspectives in regards to the primary and secondary research questions. Finally, it identified major the three major external international players and their motivations and concerns.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This section will identify how the researcher will apply the qualitative research methodology and organize the report for final presentation.

Methodology

There are two main forms of research methodology, qualitative and quantitative. Quantitative research is explaining phenomena by collecting numerical data that are analyzed using mathematically based methods (in particular statistics)” (Muijs 2004, 1). Usually the purpose of this method of research is to test proposed theories with statistical data to determine validation. On the other hand, Qualitative research is aimed at gaining a deep understanding of a specific organization or event, rather than surface description of a large sample of a population. It aims to provide an explicit rendering of the structure, order, and broad patterns found among a group of participants . . . it generates data about human groups in social settings” (California State University Long Beach n.d.).

The primary choice for methodology for this study was a product of the changing political, diplomatic, and military environments taking place in Sudan. One of the strengths of the qualitative approach is that its investigative characteristic of research frequently fall(s) within the context of discovery rather than verification” (Ambert, et al. 1995, 880). Since the USG strategy is still evolving, and a large portion of research dealt with understanding the positions displayed by external players and the factors behind the Northern and Southern Sudanese governments, the author believes this research is gathered, sorted, and illustrated most efficiently by primarily using qualitative

methodology. In some situations, quantitative methodology was utilized during this study to compare figures, finances, or troop strengths. The author incorporated this information to provide a comprehensive overview on the nations involved and their circumstances.

In following the qualitative method of research, this paper will identify the problem and background, develop a hypothesis, and then collect materials and facts that will support or refute the hypothesis. From that evidence and analysis, the researcher will develop conclusions, presenting those conclusions in the form of a recommendation to AFRICOM.

Identify the Problem

The decision of Southern Sudan to secede will no doubt have profound repercussions on the stability of both Sudan and nations in the surrounding region. Both state and non-state actors have positioned in Sudan for their advantage. National actors such as China and Egypt, in addition to influence from the UN and AU, significantly affect the management of regional tension. The impact of instability in Sudan will also affect regional stability in sub-Saharan Africa, a region that is becoming increasingly more important to US global interests. Furthermore, US concern that instability could renew itself in conflict leading to civil war, destruction of a potential economic windfall, further destabilizing a very turbulent region and allowing terrorist sanctuaries, warrants rapid US government, and possibly military involvement.

Hypothesis Development

As discussed in chapter 2 of this document, there are a number of factors that influence stability in Sudan. These factors are clearer to the world as Southern Sudan

takes concrete actions supporting secession. During the period leading to and immediately following Southern Sudan's independence, there will be numerous opportunities for state and non-state actors to influence regional stability. Decisions made by these actors have the potential to disturb the current fragile equilibrium on government, economic, military, humanitarian, and civil rights matters.

This paper hypothesizes that maintaining and strengthening current equilibrium is possible with the US application of DIME influence, and in particular, a precise application of military power. Proper application of this power will deter aggression, promote cooperation and security development, and send a clear international message to the NCP, PRC, AU, and Southern Sudan of US commitment to a free and stable Southern Sudan.

Collection of Materials and Facts

Due to the sheer enormity of the issues that plague the Sudan region, research was conducted from a very wide variety of sources down to the specific perspectives from individuals. When possible the author used first person accounts, reports, and books to develop a foundation for understanding the situation in Sudan, or to directly address one of the research questions. Of note, it is the opinion of this researcher that many journal articles were presented with a bias in favor of Southern Sudan. This is to say, whether it be right or whether it be wrong, many of the articles had a subtle undertone of political or humanitarian favor for the Southern Sudanese people and GoSS.

This study separated sources and materials through the following methods:

First, cultural understanding and historical background of the numerous conflicts, attempts for peace, and understanding of the current peace treaty was constructed by gathering historical accounts. These documents allowed the researcher to identify the problem, understand actions taken, and the potential of future actions to take place.

Next, it is essential to understand the external actors, and the influence, which they have on Sudan, each other, and stability in the region. These sources of information provide an insight into the motivation, strategy, and concerns of the actors. It should provide the reader an understanding of the players involved and their concerns.

Finally, for the purpose of this paper, the researcher gathered information directly corresponding to the US' approach to stability in Sudan. A number of US strategic documents and conversations provided comprehension for US diplomatic, economic, and military positioning. They further illustrate the strengths and limitations on using those national instruments of power.

Analysis

The study analyzed information by consistently narrowing the scope. The author considered three main tiers to consistently focus and narrow the study. The purpose of narrowing the scope was to display how each level of involvement interrelated with the previous and subsequent levels. The three tiers of analysis are:

1. Identify the international environment; what capabilities and efforts the larger international community is applying to reduce instability in Sudan.

2. Identify the USG's approach to stabilizing Sudan; how the WOG approach is working in support of its overall interests.

3. Application of the US military. This analysis determined if the US military does engage in Sudan, what capabilities it can provide across the full spectrum of operations to improve stability. Because this is the focus of the study, a number of possibilities will be presented discussing potential military application with consideration of the different actors, issues, and sources of instability, in comparison to USG interests.

Development of the Conclusion and Recommendation

Analysis led the researcher to a number of conclusions for presentation. These conclusions ultimately closed with a recommendation for specific application of the military instrument of power to reduce tension and improve stability in Sudan.

Presentation

The research study has been prepared in a five chapter format. Each chapter was developed upon the foundation of the previous chapter. The structure of the study is as follows:

Chapter 1 provides the reader an understanding of the problem, its significance, and research into the background of the issue.

Chapter 2 thoroughly examines literature from different perspectives of the conflict and players.

Chapter 3 discusses and illustrates the methodology of the study.

Chapter 4 analyzes the collected information for development of conclusions.

Chapter 5 presents the conclusion and recommendations.

Conclusion

This chapter discussed the different methodologies utilized by the researcher and further identified how the researcher will apply the qualitative and quantitative research methodologies.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The purpose of this chapter is to present the analysis in order to develop a conclusions and a recommendation. The author organized this analysis using an approach focused on the three parts listed below:

1. Identify the international environment; what capabilities and efforts the larger international community is applying to reduce instability in Sudan.
2. Identify the USG's approach to stabilizing Sudan; how the WOG approach is working to support overall US interests.
3. How can the US apply the military instrument of power in Sudan? This analysis determines if the US military does engage in Sudan, what are some of the capabilities the military instrument of power can provide across the full spectrum of operations to improve stability.

The author will present four options illustrating potential military application with considerations for the different actors, issues, and sources of instability. These options of US military power were selected because they were either directly addressed during research or have a historical record of success in recent campaigns. Three criteria were utilized to determine the potential for overall success for each of the applications of power.

The International Arena

The international response to Northern and Southern Sudan has been robust. Not including private donors, non-government organizations, or corporate providers, 63

different countries participate in the UN peace keeping mission, providing it military personnel and another 40 countries provide police personnel in support of the UN operations in Sudan (United Nations n.d.). The AU is also serving in a major supporting role in Sudan; however, the majority of its efforts have focused on the Darfur region, and not in maintaining stability in Southern Sudan.

As of October 2010, the UN Mission in Sudan employs 10,592 UN uniformed personnel in military and law enforcement roles (United Nations n.d.). While this appears impressive, it is important to note that Sudan is roughly one-quarter the size of the US with over 45 million people (Central Intelligence Agency n.d.). If UN forces applied the appropriate civil unrest peacekeeping force ratio of 4-10 troops per 1000 citizens in Southern Sudan, the actual number of required UN and SPLA troops would be between 33,040 and 82,600 (based on the 2009 census) (Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation 2010; Kozelka 2008). Compound this problem with the vast array of peacekeeper duties such as patrolling contested areas, investigating attacks, monitoring ceasefires, providing security for humanitarian relief organizations, protecting IDP camps, and gathering intelligence, and it quickly illustrates the complexity of the mission and the lack of adequate personnel.

Other UN organizations, such as the United Nations Development Program, are working with both Northern and Southern Sudan to improve overall stability. A staff of 900 UN personnel is present in all 10 Southern States, the conflict regions of Darfur, and both Juba City and Khartoum. This group manages the Sudan UN Development Program and its financial resources. While the budget has seen considerable growth from \$166

million in 2007 to \$266 million in 2010, it is still insufficient to achieve the desired effect (United Nation 2011).

When considering international support, one must also consider the economy. The global economic picture looks far different now than it did five years ago, when both the UN and independent nations made large financial commitments to Sudan at the 2005 Oslo Conference. Since that conference, the Global Dow Market, a 150 stock index from blue chip companies around the world, peaked at 2793 points in December 2007. In March 2009, that market dropped 48.2 percent to its low of 1347 points, and then slowly started its climb back to 2186 by March 2011 (Wall Street Journal 2011).

It is an understatement to suggest that the global economy is experiencing significant turbulence. Economies such as Greece, Spain, Russia, and the US are suffering from major financial sways. With an annual global UN peacekeeping operations budget of almost \$8 billion for 2011, the \$1 billion budgeted for Sudan is becoming tougher to justify. This is mainly due to contributor nations receiving public criticism to retain funds and manage pressing internal issues (United Nations General Assembly 2011).

Specifically, the US provides 22 percent of the UN's annual operating budget; it also furnished 27 percent, or \$2.6 billion of the 2010 UN peacekeeping budget (Roeten 2010; US Department of State 2010c). In addition to UN peacekeeping funding, the US contributed \$3.6 billion in humanitarian and development assistance to countries served by UN peacekeepers, and another \$4 million to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (US Department of State 2010c). As the public outcry, financial

burdens, and government politics continue to grow with relation to US spending on defense and overseas operations, this will be an issue that receives a great deal of scrutiny.

The operations tempo for UN and AU forces is also very high, and continuing to escalate. As demand for UN worldwide deployments continues to increase, the international support for staffing has not kept pace with that increase. Intensified UN deployments, partnered with the 65,000 UN troops deployed in support of International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, have significantly reduced available resources to influence low intensity conflicts and stability operations (Center on International Cooperation at New York University 2009). Of note, while the US provides over 25 percent of UN peacekeeping forces, a clear majority when viewing the international community, it has provided no troops to UN operations in Sudan. US support for UN operations is mostly in the Afghanistan area of responsibility (Center on International Cooperation at New York University 2009).

The support found in the international arena is collapsing under these growing economic burdens. Because the world continues to experience new challenges like the Middle-East unrest, factors such as those listed above, illustrate that the UN and AU do not have the resources available to respond to the myriad anticipated concerns.

The US Approach

The US has attempted to take a multifaceted approach to activities in Sudan. The DOS manages diplomatic issues, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) manages humanitarian issues and development activities, and the

Department of Defense is responsible for security and the development of host nation military capabilities. This next section will analyze how the DOS and USAID approach each of these issues in Sudan. This will be followed by the analysis of the Department of Defense options.

US Recognition of Southern Sudan

It is important to mention that the US has clearly chosen sides. US intent to recognize Southern Sudan as an independent nation took place a mere 30 days after the January 2011 referendum. Furthermore, US AID has focused its efforts mostly in Southern Sudan, some of the border regions, and the Darfur areas. While there has been discussion of providing aid outside of these areas, those actions are frequently prevented due to security conditions for aid workers or political concerns. This funding, in conjunction with new diplomatic ties directly to Southern Sudan, continuing economic sanctions with the Northern government, and recent SPLA-US military security cooperation efforts, indicate the USG recognizes potential in its new African ally. It is unquestionably making a concerted effort to develop the new nation and government in Southern Sudan.

The US State Department

American efforts to shape global order and lead the international community have positioned it where its interests are interconnected with many nations, a concern less significant prior to globalization. African issues, which have little US strategic appeal before, are now significant interests. The US directly identifies these interests in its

overarching strategic approach, the US NSS. The 2010 document directly references the US position on Sudan:

The United States remains committed to working with the international community to support implementation of outstanding elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and ensure that the referendum on the future of Southern Sudan in 2011 happens on time and that its results are respected. In addition, we will continue to engage in the efforts necessary to support peace and stability after the referendum, and continue to work to secure peace, dignity, and accountability in Darfur. (The White House 2010a, 48)

Individual departments and agencies of the USG find themselves connected through a family of strategic planning documents. For the DOS, this guidance is the Strategic Plan. Supplementing the Strategic Plan is the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. Both the Strategic Plan and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review are nested with the NSS, just as the National Defense Strategy is for Department of Defense. Ultimately, the goal of this process is to synergize the entire spectrum of government capabilities and have them working together in a WOG approach to solve complex issues.

—The mission of State . . . with regard to crisis and conflict in fragile states is to reduce or eliminate short, medium, and long-term threats to American security and to help create opportunities for governments and their citizens to address domestic challenges themselves” (US Department of State 2010c, 127). In the DOS, the priority placed on the development of Southern Sudan arguably ranked third, immediately behind operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (Crow 2011). The DOS has approached this mission in Sudan by dedicating significant assets to developing diplomatic ties, the rule of government, and the peaceful implementation of the CPA (Crow 2011). While the US still has no Ambassador to Sudan, it does have an embassy in Khartoum and a consulate

in Juba, Southern Sudan. The Juba consulate officially opened in 2005, a necessary step as the US became increasingly protective and internationally influential in regards to the Sudanese peace process. The US is among 20 nations that currently have consulates in Southern Sudan, including offices maintained by China and Russia. Egypt maintains four offices, all in the North. In addition to sending a clear diplomatic message and establishing stronger ties, the US further assigned a heightened level of priority to Southern Sudan when it dedicated a special Presidential Envoy, who has remained fully engaged with the CPA, referendum for independence, and now secession.

In an effort to apply its diplomatic strength and limit the economic power of the North, the DOS implemented economic sanctions and blacklisted US associated companies from conducting business with the NCP. However, the international community has significantly undermined US efforts in this arena. US application of Executive Order 13412 specifies:

All property and interests in property of the Government of Sudan that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of United States persons, including their overseas branches, are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in. (The White House 2006)

What really gives the DOS teeth is section 2 of this document:

notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the effective date of this order, all transactions by United States persons relating to the petroleum or petrochemical industries in Sudan, including, but not limited to, oilfield services and oil or gas pipelines, are prohibited. (The White House 2006)

While international sanctions also influenced Sudan, UN Security Resolution 1591 (in 2005) and UN Security Resolution 1945 (in 2009) failed to apply to any organizations operating outside of North, South and West Darfur. In failing to internationally unify

against the NCP, and attack the major source of its national income, UN sanctions have achieved very little outside of the Darfur region. Couple this with decisions made by the PRC, as a permanent member of the National Security Council, in support of the NCP, PRC energy reliance on Sudan, and PRC's sale and distribution of military weapons to the North, it is easy to understand China's conflict of interest and desire to limit the effect of US diplomacy.

The PRC defiance notwithstanding, US Executive Order 13412 does provide some enticement. Even though other nations such as China, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia constitute the majority of Sudan's import and export business, removal of the 1993 designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism and the associated 1997 and 2005 economic sanctions, would provide considerable incentive for Sudan to develop in accordance with western guidelines. Of note, the executive order specifies that Southern Sudan is not subject to US sanctions, and while new laws are convoluted, in some circumstances US oil industries may collaborate with Southern oil companies once independence is achieved (Department of US Treasury 2011).

The impact on Sudan from the designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism includes:

a long list of economic restrictions and a withdrawal of US foreign aid . . . foreign assistance, Millennium Challenge Account Funding, agricultural aid, Peace Corps programs, support through the Export-bank, support in the international financing institutions, opposition to loans or credits from the International Monetary Fund, and withholding of trade preferences under the Generalized System of Preferences. (Rennack 2005, 10)

Relief from these sanctions and restrictions has been the incentive that the US promised to evaluate if the NCP allowed the Referendum to proceed without violence. As of

7 February 2011, the US initiated steps to remove the designation, starting with a six-month review of any Northern support to terror organizations. Successful removal of this designation has the potential to reduce tension in the North. Increased financial loans, debt relief, assistance from the International Monetary Fund, and the unlikely but possible, opportunity to compete for the Millennium Challenge Fund could create major economic change. Furthermore, agricultural assistance projects have the ability to develop production of food and foster a mutually beneficial relationship between Egypt and Sudan as both of their populations continue to grow. These changes, coupled with increased revenue from corporate oil production and distribution opportunities, could provide a strong alternative to conflict over resources, and ultimately improve stability.

US Agency for International Development

The USAID is the USG's main organization responsible for international assistance and disaster relief. This independent organization receives its foreign guidance from and works directly with the State Department. Its focus is to manage a plethora of government programs from health and education to development of governance and democracy. It is the principle provider of US foreign aid to nations.

The US has provided nearly \$10 billion in aid to Sudan and the immediate region since 2005. Moreover, its continued recent support of almost \$1 billion per year directly to Sudan, makes it the largest contributor of aid to the nation (US Agency for International Development 2010).

The DOS provides USAID guidance in the Strategic Plan that is supplemented by the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. However, as an independent

agency, USAID goals and strategy align very closely with DOS, and both organizations' objectives are published together to support the NSS. Working in concert with the international community and the DOS, USAID provides staffing and funding in support of five main areas: Peace and Security, Governing Justly and Democratically, Investing in People, Economic Growth, and Humanitarian Assistance.

Between fiscal years 2009 and 2010, USAID funding to Sudan improved dramatically. Not including an equally significant amount for humanitarian assistance, overall spending for aid in Sudan increased by 13.5 percent, going from \$376.69 million in 2009 to \$427.78 million in 2010. Table 1 displays the significant increases in foreign aid between fiscal year 2009 and 2010.

Table 1. USAID areas of increased foreign aid between FY 2009 and FY 2010

Foreign Assistance Areas	FY 2009	FY 2010	Δ %
	Actual US \$	Estimate US \$	US \$
Good Governance	21,009,000.00	34,000,000.00	62% increase
Investing in People	75,918,000.00	93,596,000.00	23% Increase
Water supply and sanitation	11,000,000.00	16,000,000.00	45% increase
Economic Growth	140,790,000.00	151,893,000.00	8% increase
Agriculture	25,080,000.00	42,500,000.00	69% increase
Private Sector Competition	3,120,000.00	20,583,000.00	660% increase

Source: USAID, "Sudan Fact Sheet," http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/countries/sudan/sudan_fs.pdf (accessed 6 June 2011).

The opportunities for USAID to be productive and make a positive impact to Sudan's civil development are numerous. While the GoSS and NCP have so far met the referendum with minimal violence and conflict, there are still numerous flashpoints. The primary focus of USAID and DOS must be to legitimize the government and gain public support. To accomplish this, the main areas of concern now must be development of security, infrastructure, economic growth, and agriculture. Without these developments, there is a significant concern that the GoSS will lose public support and momentum as it attempts to stabilize the recently established government (Crow 2011).

USAID Projects

Currently, outside of Juba City and Wau there are no paved roads in Southern Sudan. In a recent discussion, a DOS member informed the author that Southern Sudan pales in comparison to the pre-US operations in Afghanistan; it is unquestionably the least developed nation he had ever operated in (Crow 2011). Keeping the present condition in mind, the task of infrastructure development is almost overwhelming.

The development of railways, roads and bridges will significantly improve commerce and the economic opportunities with internal and external business partners. USAID has provided funds to produce or repair more than twice the amount of currently existing paved roads. In addition to road networks, the Ministry of Transport has benefited from USAID's development of Southern Sudan's work force and infrastructure. Agriculture and livestock herding has traditionally been the primary source of income for up to 80 percent of the population. The massive support in the agriculture sector will lower the food deficit, increasing available food for the population, increase security and

economy through trade opportunities, and reduce the sole reliance on the oil industry (US Agency for International Development 2010).

The US has identified the need for the GoSS to develop a senior executive core capable of managing key public positions. A main concern is finding the right people to establish a strong government, resistant to corruption, and capable of managing the unresolved issues pending with the North. It will be these men and women, who will build a new country from what is now, a government primarily managed by SPLA rebel military leaders, into peaceful and democratic governance run by trained civil officials (Crow 2011).

Unresolved Issues

One of the major concerns for any USG organization taking action in Sudan must be the unresolved issues. With the fragile peace accords in place, impending national independence and an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court pending for President Omar al-Bashir, any outward show of force or offensive posturing could increase tension and renew conflict in border regions. Further complicating the environment are the continuing hostilities in Darfur, ever-growing populations in the IDP camps, indecision over migration and boundary lines, the water rights debate with Egypt, and the unresolved position on Abyei. Perhaps the most immediate and significant concern of these is the conflict over the border regions. These regions in particular, being home to a vast amount of recently discovered oil, and currently hosting troops from both the North and South, have the possibility to unhinge peace and hurl the severed nation back into conflict.

Since Southern Sudan voted to secede, and independence is scheduled for 9 July 2011, the North is about to lose a significant amount of resource revenue, land, water, and pride. This event has also set a worrisome precedent for contested regions on the border. One DOS official stated that —now that Southern Sudan has separated, we can expect Abyei to be the new South Sudan” (Crow 2011). The fact that Southern Sudan had success is in no way indicative of future independence with other regions. Due to developing financial and resource concerns, it may make future independence movements even more difficult and potentially bloody.

US Military Challenges

Before having any discussion involving the US military instrument of power, one must predicate it with an understanding of the political and physical environment. Through understanding how this atmosphere affects US options, the military can better posture to influence stability.

The Political Environment

In chapter 2 of this document, the author presented a number of factors that influenced stability in Southern Sudan. US military personnel operating in the area must manage those factors and be aware of second and third order effects of their actions. Those factors are discussed below.

How the US is Perceived

The US, as the major western power, must be aware of how it is perceived as it positions itself in Sudan, and all of Africa for the matter. While most Americans

reminisce on colonial powers as distant history, the colonial era is more recent and familiar to the people in African nations. Sudan is no different. The nation is just beginning to build its independence from foreign superpowers, and a substantial growth in US presence may have overall negative effects on promoting GoSS' national interests. The US must carefully evaluate the level of desired recognition and its reflection of Southern Sudanese independent success. US presence and assistance, without publicly perceived Southern Sudanese ownership, has the possibility to undermine GoSS legitimacy and create the image of a US puppet government.

Sudan and International Interaction

While the South is receptive to US assistance, the new government is still undetermined as to how large a foreign footprint they are willing to accept. While an increased US footprint can help develop the economy, democracy, security and regional stability, it also comes at a cost. The US insists on promoting its version of the democratic ideology, free of corruption and tyranny. This is the agreement that the US people expect countries accepting US aid to follow. It is unproven if that philosophy can withstand offers from investors without similar restrictions on support, such as China (Ntiri 2007).

In Ntiri's writing, he discussed the possible situation of a marginalized population rising up against US favored governments due to the lack of progress. In this case, Chinese actors may downplay US insistence on democracy to help those feeling abandoned by the government, leading to further instability and potential regime overthrow. The US does not have to search history too far back to see adversaries

capitalize on this situation. One can argue, in current conflicts, the commitments required by the US for change can be difficult for failing nations to accept.

The Southern Sudanese evidently understand the difference in both US strengths and expectations. A clear weakness of US foreign policy is the bureaucracy associated with US funding for civil projects. This is often tedious. However, that same process is extremely streamlined and informal when approached through the PRC and its associated organizations (Crow 2011). Contrary to the Sudanese having no problem approaching the PRC for civil project funding, they recognize the dominance of the US for promoting security (Crow 2011). Security is the foundation to legitimizing any government and obtaining public support. Every post-conflict strategy document consulted during the research of stability operations referenced the undeniable requirement to gain and maintain security. It appears that in this area the US' reputation precedes it.

Sovereignty

A major consideration in any US engagement before 9 July 2011 is the national sovereignty of Sudan. The US has maintained the premise that nations are entitled to their national sovereignty. It is a principle the US still adheres to in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and has in Sudan as well. Because the US honors the NCP's sovereignty over the entire Sudan, the US is required to seek admittance into the country through diplomatic approval by the national government. Because the US placed economic sanctions on Sudan and designated it as an international sponsor of terrorism, the nation of Sudan is not eager to support a larger US presence. Additionally, by completely severing all communications with NCP leadership and encouraging the International Criminal Court

to indict President Omar Bashir, one can assess that the NCP will continue to maintain this position for some time. It is improbable that US military or diplomatic personnel not associated with humanitarian needs or under UN and AU mandate will be permitted access to the country until after independence is established in the South.

Lines of Communication

As previously mentioned, Southern Sudan is a difficult area in which to perform any conventional military operations. Road networks and lines of communication are extremely limited and most are in very poor condition (reference figure 2). No paved roads exist outside of major urban areas, and many of the limited gravel roads are mined, unsuitable for conventional heavy equipment, and are subject to flooding and deterioration during the rainy season. In fact, as of this writing, USAID is still overseeing construction of a paved road leading 192 kilometers from Juba to the border of Uganda. This will provide Southern Sudan its first internationally paved road.

While rail lines are receiving attention from international actors, such as the UN Development Program, USAID and efforts from the PRC, this mode of transportation is still extremely limited and focused mostly in the North between Khartoum and Port Sudan. Recent Southern developments are also limited, but include a private consortium of companies from the US, Germany, and Russia which are coordinating to develop a rail network from Juba City to Uganda, and eventually to the Kenyan Indian Ocean seaports of Mombasa and Lamu. It is the intent of these companies to capitalize on the emerging market potential in Southern Sudan.

Unfortunately, aviation services are also extremely limited and undeveloped. Juba maintains the only aerodrome resembling a conventional airport in the southern region. Recent feedback on Juba's airfield indicates oversaturation with high levels of new traffic; it has limited ramp space, poor surface conditions on main taxiways, and very poor infrastructure (Cliff Lapp, Atlas Airlines, email message to author, 23 April 2011). While infrastructure improvements have begun with construction of a new passenger terminal and other support structures, the airfield still has no operational lighting or navigation aids, preventing nighttime and poor visibility flight operations. Furthermore, it suffers from abysmal security, and has frequently had arrivals and departures delayed for herds of livestock on the runway (Cliff Lapp, Atlas Airlines, email message to author, 23 April 2011).



Figure 2. Sudan: Lines of Communication

Source: Maps of the World, "Sudan Transportation Map," <http://mapsof.net/sudan/static/maps/png/sudan-1991-transportation-map> (accessed 24 April 2011).

The US Military in Sudan

In Africa, the United States will continue to maintain a limited rotational military presence to help build partner security capacity, including for peacekeeping operations; generate regional security cooperation opportunities; and foster the development of constructive African civil military relations. All such efforts to build partner capacity will pay special attention to the dynamics associated with civil military relations in host countries and will emphasize the principles of civilian control and respect for dignity, rule of law, and professionalism. The expanse of Africa and the light U.S. footprint there highlight the importance of en route infrastructure to support defense activities in theater. The United States will

work with allies and partners to enhance a defense posture that supports contingency response by improving our relationships and access agreements with African allies and partners, improving preexisting African-owned infrastructure, and exploring innovative opportunities for logistical collaboration with African militaries. We also strive to share facilities and cooperate more closely with European allies in our efforts to help African states build capacity and to prepare for contingency response. (US Department Of Defense 2010, 68)

Contrary to popular belief, the US military is well suited for the operational environment found in Southern Sudan. Since World War II, stability missions and counter insurgency warfare is the indisputable dominant form of operations that the US has undertaken. There can also be no question based on recent experience. The current US military is arguably more proficient at stability and counter insurgency operations than at any other point in its history. As a whole, the US military is well trained, operates under combat-developed doctrine, is adequately equipped and, per the NSS, prepared to “continue to engage in the efforts necessary to support peace and stability after the referendum, and continue to work to secure peace” (The White House 2010a, 48). So what is the problem?

Location, Location, Location

Perhaps the most prevalent issue is AFRICOM's current lack of manpower and resources. In preserving its decision to maintain a limited footprint, AFRICOM has also limited its ability to project conventional forces into Africa. In fact, the majority of US forces in Africa are comprised of an almost 2000-man joint force located mostly in Uganda, Tanzania, Mauritius, and Comoros (Ives 2010). Moreover, current Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa forces in Djibouti are well over 1200 miles from Darfur and almost 800 miles from Juba, Southern Sudan (Ives 2010).

Since Southern Sudan has no sea access, limited road or rail systems to neighboring states, and few airlift options due to the condition of the region's airfields, the US will have severe difficulties maintaining anything other than a small Southern Sudan footprint. The lack of transportation nodes restricts both US force projection and logistic support opportunities.

US Military Options

Since the relatively peaceful secession and execution of the CPA, the US has had to modify its plans. Initial indications of war had the US convinced that combat operations were on the horizon. Because tensions between the NCP and GoSS eased, a change in military options was also required. This next section will evaluate four possible applications of the military instrument of national power to accomplish stability operations in Southern Sudan. The four options are: the temporary assignment of a US Army Brigade Combat Team (BCT), Foreign Internal Defense (FID) operations, the positioning of standby Quick Reaction Force (QRF), or implementation of a Joint South Sudanese-US Airbase.

Characteristics for consideration

The author compared the four military options in a decision matrix format against the evaluation characteristics found in Joint Publication 5-0: *Joint Operations Planning*. Joint planners use these characteristics to review a course of action for military validity. While not all of the five joint publication's evaluation characteristics were applicable to this study, three of them were. As defined by Joint Publication 5-0, in order to be valid, a course of action must be:

1. Adequate—Can accomplish the mission within the commander's guidance
2. Feasible—Can accomplish the mission within the established time, space, and resource limitations
3. Acceptable— balances the cost and risk with the advantage gained.

To compare and contrast these characteristics, we must first establish a definition for a number of terms.

Commander's Guidance: One of the issues with US operations in Sudan is that the established guidelines are very nebulous. For the purpose of this decision matrix, the author used a hypothetical commander's guidance:

In the interest of securing a stable Southern Sudanese region, the goal of the US military is to promote stability through military operations that develop the SPLA's defense capabilities against internal and external threats. Additionally, in understanding the current operational environment, it is essential that the US maintain a minimal footprint, while still possessing the ability to respond to humanitarian needs and potential sources of conflict.

Resource limitations: Options will be considered in relation to current force structure, deployed units, available infrastructure and financial support.

Risk: The characteristic of risk will be considered in relation to US political tolerance for loss of American life and detriment to US national image. Another aspect of risk is the likelihood of US military actions increasing tension and provoking resumed North-South violence.

Brigade Combat Team

Adequate: The deployment of a BCT meets the established commander's guidance, and can answer the question of adequacy. A BCT provides a significant amount of firepower, personnel, and capability. While the 3000 to 4000 troops are more

suited for conventional operations of security, offense, defense and even humanitarian actions, they can perform some aspects of FID operations, and have currency in these tasks due to US current operations.

Feasible: BCTs have a very large footprint, and with no accessible airfields for C-17 or C-5 aircraft, these units would be severely limited on available equipment. Logistical resupply would be difficult. In addition to the enormous expense of fielding this force, necessary facilities would need to be constructed to billet, secure and support this force. Finally, the US Army just does not currently have the available troops when considering the two major operations occurring in Afghanistan and Iraq, a factor that may change as the US continues reducing operations in those regions.

Acceptable: The BCT's combat power does provide its own security, reducing the risk to the unit. However, the political risk of another Iraq or Afghanistan is almost incomprehensible to the US public at this point, and furthermore, prior to 9 July 2011, this option would be a clear act of aggression against the sovereign nation of Sudan. Finally, for a nation trying to avoid being labeled a colonial power, it is a very overt and almost flamboyant approach to the issue. With potential Chinese manipulation of African decision makers regarding US intentions, this risk would be difficult to justify to the Sudanese people, regional neighbors, international actors, and the US population.

Foreign Internal Defense

Joint Publication 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*, defines FID as ~~the~~ participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization, to free and

protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism and other threats to their security” (The Joint Staff 2010, ix). The overall objective of FID is to develop the host nation’s internal defense so it can defend itself against internal and external threats. The US military, civil government and private contractors have personnel that specialize in such activities.

Adequate: FID presents a very strong option for policy makers. Traditionally, units conducting FID are usually comprised of special operations forces from either US Army or US Navy, third country militaries, or contractors. They are tailored to the mission and could provide a good option for internal development of SPLA forces. When combined with other government stability operations, FID units provide a major capability in assisting a nation to establish security. However, due to these special operations unit’s force structure and mission set, they lack firepower and a logistics support network, and are capable of providing only a limited potential to deter aggression and assist in humanitarian operations.

Feasible: This modular special operations force normally operates with a small footprint, requires a limited supply chain, and can function with little outside assistance. In many cases, these units have adapted to living with their host nation counterparts. They require little established infrastructure and force protection would be managed by SPLA or a blended protection detail with the FID forces and the host nation’s security forces.

Acceptable: Because of the small footprint, there is also a reduction in the security risk. Additionally, these units are affordable, they have a small logistics support

requirement compared to conventional forces, and their presence does not signify a major conventional US military presence.

Quick Reaction Force

A QRF is usually a small, tailored unit that has the ability to arrive at an area of conflict within ten to fifteen minutes. This unit specializes in offensive maneuvers, and recapturing or holding a penetrated perimeter. Among other locations, the US has used these units in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Korea. Currently the AU and UN have a QRF established to respond to hostilities around civilian areas in Darfur.

Adequate: The positive attribute of having a QRF either in Sudan or a neighboring country is a modular unit, detailed to fit the crisis. It provides surgical firepower, good tactical mobility, and a very small footprint. Humanitarian issues and tasks other than armed response are somewhat more difficult to prepare for, although in some of these situations, the QRF could offer limited capabilities.

Feasible: This option would require a very limited footprint in Sudan, but would require a base of operations in a neighboring nation. Additionally, this nation would need to be in support of the US concept of operations, and allow logistical resupply and security to the QRF. As with previous options, unless contractors are utilized inside of Southern Sudan, the US still faces issues with sovereignty and must travel considerable distances between any reasonable basing option and the response area.

Acceptable: Similar to the FID option, the QRF provides a limited force projection, possibly enabling US, Sudanese, and international public tolerance. The force

would be secure in a neighboring host nation and the operation would be financially justifiable.

US and Southern Sudanese Joint Air Base

Joint airbases have been a method for the US to provide presence without making a full commitment to the manpower, resources, infrastructure development, financial, and diplomatic obligations required to stage a US airbase on foreign soil. The US currently has a number of these partner airbases in Turkey, the former Soviet Union, Germany, and New Zealand (among others). In some locations, there are no assigned aircraft and only a small number of US personnel to manage refueling and limited maintenance on occasional through flight operations. In other partnerships, there is a robust US presence with assigned aircraft, support personnel, and complete infrastructure.

Adequate: A joint mobility stop provides the capability for rapid force generation. This would allow for staging of combat or humanitarian operations as required. The response time will be days instead of hours, but this option potentially offers a 24-hour US presence and a secure, established facility to project full-spectrum operations from if necessary.

Feasible: This option requires massive infrastructure development, some of which is already underway. It also requires the development of Air Traffic Control radar, some navigation aids, and potentially a robust fuel supply system. Additionally, neighboring countries would need to provide access and over-flight agreements for US aircraft, which can be a difficult task, especially if influenced by the Chinese, Egyptians, or the NCP.

There can be no doubt that sovereignty will be a concern with this option, at least prior to 9 July 2011.

Acceptable: The risk to US personnel is relatively low, but the initial cost is high. However, the political-public risk in the US is low, but the international perception of the US developing a “military base” in Southern Sudan could provide reasons for undecided internal opposition groups to sway against the GoSS. This unilateral support from the US may also increase political pressure in Sudanese-PRC and African-US relations.

The Breakdown

Each military option has a number of pros and cons, table 2 displays each option against the criteria discussed above. Symbols in the figure represent whether the option is favorable to the evaluation criteria (+), neutral to the criteria (0), or unfavorable to the criteria (-).

Table 2. Breakdown of Military Options

Characteristics	Options			
	BCT	FID	QRF	Joint Base
Adequate	+	0	0	0
Feasible	-	+	-	0
Acceptable	-	+	+	+

Source: Created by Author

Conclusion

There can be little question that each of these options have both positive and negative contributions to the US' position in Sudan. Each provides a different element of stability, capabilities, limitations, and risks. What can be determined from the analysis of these options is there is no one perfect solution to the complex national and international situation, which is taking place in Sudan. Moreover, the environment, both politically and militarily, is under a constant state of change. As with most contingency plans, any option that the US exercises will need to adapt to the changing environment.

This chapter discussed the method of analysis, the international actors, US WOG actions, and current US challenges. It presented specific challenges to the US military, and analyzed four different options for military action in Southern Sudan.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Chapter 4 of this document presented four different options for exercising the US military instrument of power to improve stability in Southern Sudan. This chapter will present the synthesis from that analysis. Furthermore, the chapter will discuss the projected consequences and impact of option implementation. Finally, the chapter will conclude with a recommendation for action and further study.

Study Conclusions

The study analyzed the use of US military forces posturing in Sudan to reduce instability. It looked at a US Army BCT, a standby QRF, implementation of a special operations (or similar third nation or contractor) unit to conduct FID operations, or the development of Juba City Airfield for combined operations with the Southern Sudanese. Each option provided a number of potential pros and cons when considered against operational and political environment. Additionally, the author weighed each option against the measures of being feasible, adequate, and acceptable. After considering these criteria, the options were ranked.

Due to the complexity of the situation, there was no clear decisive option that met all criteria completely. Two of the options presented viable choices for future action, and two were deemed less than effective. While the political, economic, and military environments continue to evolve, the recommendations and conclusions from this study are based on the data that is currently available.

Unlikely Options

The BCT presented the most unlikely course of action for this scenario. Its deployment cost, lack of available logistic nodes and infrastructure, and potential to provoke the NCP and other actors were clear cons to this option. While the option did provide adequate manpower and firepower, its political and military message can easily be misconstrued as a clear sign of aggression to both allies and neutral parties. This option presents enormous risk to both the American people and the US position in Africa. Additionally, this option should only be exercised in a case where the US has fully identified its objectives, and those objectives necessitate the need, or threat, for full conventional combat operations. The cost and risk currently outweigh the established objectives.

The QRF also presents an unlikely course of action for current conditions in Southern Sudan. Without having established operating rights in Southern Sudan or a neighboring country, the transit time from Djibouti is excessive and the size of the force would be too limited to respond to organized troop movements from either rebel guerrilla units or NCP troops. There is potential in this option, but it would require cooperation from a bordering nation that agrees to the US concept of operations. Furthermore, this nation must be willing to accept criticism for condoning US action, action which could be internationally interpreted as empire building.

Likely Options

While there is a high level of technical expertise and expense involved in getting Juba Airport up to western operational standards, this option provides a unique

opportunity. The US prides itself on the ability to project military power anywhere in the world within 24 hours; this operation becomes safer and more efficient if an operational landing facility is available. Having developed logistic nodes, which can receive and support troop and logistic movements is essential for future combat or humanitarian operations. For this to be a viable option, the facility should have at least a Department of Defense non-precision instrument approach (allowing for night-time and weather obscured arrivals and departures), airfield lighting, security, material handling equipment, fuel services, and minimal maintenance. While significant improvements are underway, further development is required for this to be a practical option for the US military. Unfortunately, a partner airbase in itself does not adequately accomplish the mission of increased regional stability in Southern Sudan. For this option to be successful, it would need to be complemented with one of the other options present earlier or FID.

FID currently presents the best option for meeting the criteria of being adequate, feasible, and acceptable. The limited footprint, logistics, and infrastructure required by special operations units make this option favorable considering the environment and logistics lines. These factors are also promising considering the delicate political environment, international risk, and associated expenses. This option continues to become even more attractive if the US could facilitate or employ non-US military members or contracted employees to conduct such operations. In fact during a discussion with an AFRICOM planner, he cited these methods of cooperation as one of their more realistic options, which AFRICOM could exercise with third country intermediaries

operating with similar equipment, weapons, organization, and doctrine (Charles Kaune, AFRICOM, email message to author, 3 February 2011).

Another consideration, which makes FID a very worthy option is that it capitalizes on the current overt stability efforts being executed by the DOS and USAID. This package of diplomacy, aid, and restrained military influence complement each other very well as the US attempts to stabilize Southern Sudan. Furthermore, the perception from international spectators can be illustrated as one of security cooperation and national development, rather than empire building.

International Actors

In chapter 2 of this document, the author introduced a number of actors that are influencing Sudan's stability. Unquestionably, regional influence from China and Egypt must be considered. While the Nile River is a major Egyptian security concern, it is anticipated that Southern Sudan will have a relatively limited effect on its flow. Additionally, talks are already underway regarding a water rights agreement, which the GoSS is expected to sign with Egypt. However, while Egypt has traditionally had very strong ties with the US, the recently regime installed may not be as receptive to US military interaction in an area where it's been the sole dominate power, and in such close proximity to a resource it has identified as a critical vulnerability.

On the other hand, China's current Sudanese interests must be interpreted as more than merely economic. Due to the nation's current rate of economic growth and forecasted energy and natural resource dependency, China's advancing position in Sudan is a product of its national security. Up to this point, China has exercised only soft power

through the application of diplomatic, economic, and informational pressures, but this will eventually change. As resources become scarcer and competition continues to escalate, China, like the US, will become more active in projecting its power to influence the region. Based on China's perception of US hegemony, one can be certain that the PRC will be carefully observing and posturing all elements of DIME to stay competitive in the region. With this in mind, US military operations that maintain a limited footprint and surgical focus are less likely to meet PRC diplomatic resistance.

North versus South . . . and the US

Historical trends illustrate that cultural tension and Northern dominance will be a difficult issue to circumvent as these two regions continue to develop in distinctly different fashions. Of recent concern for the NCP are the number of uprisings occurring through Africa and the Middle East. In a nation where the ruling Arab party only accounts for 39 percent of the population, the threat of regime change should not be overlooked (Central Intelligence Agency n.d.). It is not out of the question to assess that President Bashir and the NCP will require an economic or military victory to sustain power and maintain financial stability. While US diplomatic and financial concession may be potentially prosperous to the NCP, these acts do not necessarily foreshadow peace. As recently demonstrated by the Abyei border occurrences, future regional conflict is almost inevitable.

As the South continues to advance its government, exploit its resources, and modernize its military, there will be tension with the North. Key agreements in resource sharing, land and water rights, and development on the Border States will have a major

impact on continuing North and South peace. While bolstering the GoSS defenses, the US must maintain a small footprint and remain focused on building the legitimacy of the South's government and its ability to independently rule.

In regards to the US, the last five years have been extremely difficult for US-Sudanese policy development. Much of this is the result of international and public perception, political risk, and availability of resources and funding. Essential to any further action in Southern Sudan, must be a determination on the duration of US involvement and levels of acceptable force and risk. With AFRICOM already initiating some security cooperation agreements with Southern Sudan, the issue becomes what does the NCP consider a tolerable level of US interaction, and what incentives will the US have to provide to in order to prevent Northern aggression? To date, exchange programs in professional military education and an AFRICOM sponsored non-commissioned officer academy have not escalated the military situation. It is unknown if FID or improvements made to Juba Airfield would be met with the same acceptance. North-South resource management and US incentives will be the mitigating factors as the North's leadership approaches these significant decision points.

Recommendation

It is this author's recommendation that the US employ FID personnel, either US military, foreign military, or contractors, to train and develop the SPLA forces. The employment of a FID organization, in cooperation with other US activities from DOS and USAID, will allow Southern Sudan to build a professional military, with the ability to defend its borders, manage internal instabilities, deter aggression, and build legitimacy.

Additionally, until Southern Sudan is prepared to manage military affairs on their own, the improvement of the airfield at Juba City offers a significant increase to the US' ability to respond to humanitarian situations and crises. Furthermore, improvements at Juba Airfield will also facilitate DOS, USAID, and UN operations in the region. These enhancements, without the addition of permanently assigned aircraft or forces, will improve response time and force projection capability, while reducing the perception of a constant US military presence. When considered in conjunction with the WOG approach, these actions will send a message of the US supporting the GoSS to the NCP, PRC, GoSS, and other international actors, while reducing the image of US involvement to the American people. This course of action provides US policy makers a flexible option that can intensify to support full-spectrum operations if necessary.

Recommendations for Further Study

The study of US military operations in Sudan will be progressive, and as such, the opportunity for study in this area will be both abundant and constantly changing. It is this researcher's belief that there is value in studying the vulnerabilities, capabilities and opportunities of the NCP and its key personalities. Current events, such as the regime changes in Egypt, Libya, and Southern Sudan may produce opportunities that US decision makers can harness and exploit.

There is also opportunity for the study of future Southern Sudanese-US relationships and regional security cooperation. As discussed earlier, as resources and competition in the region progress, the US will require a more overt, active, and influential position in Africa. With Southern Sudan improving its capabilities and

infrastructure, it may provide an initial foothold to support US security interests in Africa.

Finally, while the focus of this study was specifically on how the US can posture to influence stability in Sudan, it should not be overlooked that there is a perfect opportunity for the PRC and USG to work together in this region to bring continued peace and economic growth. In many ways the US, GoSS, and PRC share similar goals and synergizing efforts could further develop infrastructure, improve the economy, and build legitimacy. An increase in regional stability and building Southern Sudan's resistance as a terrorist safe-haven are potential second order effects of these actions from which the US could benefit.

Conclusion

It is in the interest of the US, the PRC, Egypt, the NCP, and GoSS to make peace and reap the mutual benefits of a transformed economic environment. Furthermore, the progression of both Northern and Southern Sudan to a democratic nation devoid of pressures for domination, can act as a catalyst for ensuring peaceful growth. The determining factor to this expansion will be if economic and diplomatic factors alone constitute a strong enough deterrence to conflict or if the military instrument of power will be required to influence peace. If the military instrument of power is applied, the two most favorable options are employment of FID personnel and the development of the Juba City airport. The implantation of these options, in coordination with the WOG approach, can increase stability and GoSS legitimacy in Southern Sudan.

While new challenges continue to influence the region, US military posturing can reduce instability, provide direction and leadership, and potentially deter and respond to emerging threats. The US leadership still needs to develop a clear policy, but the education of the GoSS military through FID and the ability of the US to respond to crises with viable logistic nodes presents potential for the US military to conduct full spectrum operations if so desired by the GoSS and President of the United States.

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